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PRECEDENTIAL 
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Kenyado D. Newsuan, Deceased Plaintiff, 
                                                       Appellant 
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CITY OF PHILADELPHIA, POLICE OFFICER THOMAS 
DEMPSEY, Badge # 1577 
 
_______________ 
 
On Appeal from the U.S. District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 2-14-cv-02331) 
District Judge:  Honorable William H. Yohn 
_______________ 
 
Argued February 11, 2016 
 
Before:  FUENTES, KRAUSE, and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion Filed: September 20, 2016) 
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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
FUENTES, Circuit Judge: 
Kenyado Newsuan was standing in the street, naked, 
high on PCP, and yelling and flailing his arms.  Philadelphia 
police officer Thomas Dempsey arrived on the scene and, 
without waiting for backup, ordered Newsuan to approach.  
What happened next is a matter of some dispute, but what 
happened at the end of the encounter is not: Newsuan 
attacked Dempsey, slammed him into multiple cars, and tried 
to remove Dempsey’s handgun.  At that point, Dempsey shot 
and killed Newsuan.   
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The administratrix of Newsuan’s estate sued Dempsey 
and the City of Philadelphia under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for using 
unconstitutionally excessive force.  The District Court 
granted summary judgment to the defendants.  On appeal, 
Plaintiff argues that the shooting was unreasonable under the 
Fourth Amendment because Dempsey unnecessarily initiated 
a one-on-one confrontation with Newsuan that led to the 
subsequent fatal altercation.  Whatever the merits of that 
liability theory in the abstract, we conclude that Newsuan’s 
violent attack on officer Dempsey was a superseding cause 
that severed any causal link between Dempsey’s initial 
actions and his subsequent justified use of lethal force.  We 
will therefore affirm. 
 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Factual Background 
In the early morning hours of April 22, 2012, Officer 
Thomas Dempsey of the City of Philadelphia Police 
Department was on solo patrol in a radio car in North 
Philadelphia.  Dempsey was armed with a baton, a taser, and 
a nine-millimeter Glock handgun.  Around 2:00 a.m., 
Dempsey received a radio call that a naked man was standing 
in the street in the 5800 block of North Mascher Street.  
Dempsey and two other patrol officers responded to the call, 
but found no one.  Around 5:30 a.m., Dempsey responded to 
another call about a naked man on the same block, but again 
found no one. 
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At approximately 6:00 a.m., a passing motorist 
informed Dempsey that a naked man was in the street at the 
corner of North Mascher and Nedro Avenue.  Dempsey 
radioed in the information and drove down North Mascher to 
the intersection.  There, Dempsey saw a naked man, later 
identified as Kenyado Newsuan, standing in front of a 
residence at 5834 North Mascher.   
 
Accounts diverge as to what happened next.  The 
record contains testimony from four eyewitnesses: Officer 
Dempsey, Juan Cruz, Raimundo Rivera, and Newsuan’s 
girlfriend, Christina La Torre.  
 
 i. Testimony of Officer Dempsey 
 
 Dempsey testified that as he crossed Nedro Avenue 
into the 5800 block of North Mascher, he saw Newsuan 
standing in the middle of the street.  Dempsey estimated 
Newsuan to be six feet tall and 220 pounds.  As Dempsey 
pulled to a stop, Newsuan began walking out of the street 
toward a house (later determined to be La Torre’s residence).  
Dempsey did not radio to dispatch that he had encountered 
the subject or stopped his car.  As Newsuan headed toward 
the house, Dempsey exited the car with his taser in his hand 
and told Newsuan to “come here.”1  Newsuan began 
screaming obscenities at Dempsey and “flailing his arms 
around.”2  Dempsey could see that Newsuan was completely 
naked and had nothing in his hands.  Dempsey told Newsuan 
                                              
1 J.A. 102. 
2 Id. 103. 
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to “[c]ome here” several more times, but Newsuan continued 
up the walkway to the house.3  Newsuan entered the house for 
approximately two seconds and then emerged back onto the 
walkway.  He was still naked, and Dempsey could see that he 
did not have a weapon.   
 
Upon emerging from the house, Newsuan began 
running toward Dempsey and yelling.  Dempsey gave two 
verbal commands to stop.  When Newsuan was five feet 
away, Dempsey fired his taser into Newsuan’s chest.  
Newsuan kept coming forward and grabbed Dempsey’s shirt.  
A violent struggle ensued.  Newsuan struck Dempsey in the 
head multiple times, threw Dempsey up against a parked van, 
and then pushed him into a parked SUV.  As they were 
wrestling against the SUV, Newsuan reached for Dempsey’s 
service weapon.  Dempsey removed the gun from its holster, 
wedged it between his body and Newsuan’s, and, from a 
distance of no more than two inches, fired two shots into 
Newsuan’s chest.  Newsuan attempted to reach for the gun, 
and Dempsey shot him again in the chest.  Still grappling, 
Newsuan reached for the gun again, and Dempsey shot him 
again.  Newsuan collapsed face down and died.  La Torre 
then emerged from the house screaming and crying; 
according to Dempsey, this was the first time he encountered 
her.  Dempsey was taken to a hospital, treated for minor 
injuries, and released the same night.   
 
  ii. Testimony of Juan Cruz 
 
 Cruz lived in a street-facing apartment on North 
Mascher.  At around 5:40 a.m., while Cruz was lying in bed, 
                                              
3 Id. 104. 
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he heard a commotion between two people.  He looked out 
his window and saw Dempsey and Newsuan standing 
approximately eight feet apart and “screaming at each 
other.”4  Newsuan “was approaching” Dempsey.5  When 
Newsuan closed within four feet of Dempsey, Dempsey shot 
him with a taser.  After being hit with the taser, Newsuan 
“stopped, stuttered a little bit,” and then “just rushed” 
Dempsey.6  Newsuan lifted Dempsey up by his belt, began 
“beating” Dempsey and “slamming” him onto the hood of the 
squad car, and then pushed Dempsey against a parked 
vehicle.7  At that point “it looked like [Newsuan] was going 
for” Dempsey’s gun.8  Cruz heard a series of gunshots, and 
Newsuan fell to the ground.   
 
  iii. Testimony of Raimundo Rivera 
 
Like Cruz, Rivera also lived in a street-facing 
apartment on North Mascher.  In the early morning hours, he 
heard yelling outside his apartment and what sounded like a 
car door slamming.  He also heard a man yelling, “I’m 
Jehovah.  The end is near.”9  Rivera then heard (but did not 
see) someone being tased.  Rivera testified that he did not 
hear “any statements or yelling or anything immediately 
preceding the taser,” and he never heard Dempsey issue any 
                                              
4 Id. 145. 
5 Id. 
6 Id. 146. 
7 Id. 140, 146-47. 
8 Id. 147. 
9 Id. 167, 172. 
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commands to stop or get down on the ground.10  Rivera got 
up and went to the window, where he saw Newsuan 
“completely naked, rushing over to the police officer.”11  
Newsuan “slam[med] the officer against his patrol car and 
grab[bed] him by the neck and start[ed] pummeling his head 
against the car.”12   Newsuan “reach[ed] for” Dempsey’s 
gun.13  While Newsuan “had him by the neck,” Dempsey 
unholstered the gun and shot Newsuan three times at close 
range, at which point Newsuan fell to the ground.14  
 
  iv. Testimony of Christina La Torre 
 
La Torre testified that on the night of April 21, 
Newsuan showed up at her house high on PCP15 and acting 
paranoid. Over the course of the night, Newsuan became 
progressively more agitated, running out of the house and into 
the street several times and yelling nonsensical phrases.  At 
some point around sunrise, Newsuan removed his clothes and 
walked back onto North Mascher.  Some minutes later, 
Dempsey’s cruiser started coming up the block.  La Torre, 
who was standing near the doorway of her home, told 
Newsuan to go inside to avoid arrest.  Newsuan began 
walking toward the house.   According to La Torre, Dempsey 
pulled up and asked her “what’s the problem.”16  At this 
point, Newsuan was “standing right there and trying to go 
                                              
10 Id. 168, 175-76. 
11 Id. 168. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. 169. 
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into the house.”17  La Torre told Dempsey, “he’s on PCP” and 
“he needs to be 302’d”—meaning, in police code, that 
Newsuan needed to be involuntarily committed to a mental 
health facility.18  Dempsey told her, “don’t worry about it, 
everything is under control.”19  He also instructed her not to 
let Newsuan into the house because there might be weapons 
inside.   
 
Dempsey began walking from the street toward the 
house.  As he did so, he said to Newsuan, “hey you, come 
here.”20  Newsuan “didn’t say anything” but just “star[ed] at” 
Dempsey.21  Dempsey walked up the path to the house and 
repeated the command “to come towards him.”22  According 
to La Torre, Newsuan “just look[ed] at” her.23  Dempsey 
backed up, stepped down onto the pavement, and asked 
                                                                                                     
15 PCP is the common abbreviation for phencyclidine, “a 
controlled substance which causes hallucinations and serious 
psychological disturbances.”  Guilbeau v. W.W. Henry Co., 
85 F.3d 1149, 1164 n.41 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing R. SLOANE, 
THE SLOANE-DORLAND ANNOTATED MEDICAL 
LEGAL DICTIONARY 545 (1987)). 
16 Id. 203. 
17 Id.   
18 Id. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. 204. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. 
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Newsuan if he could hear him.  Newsuan “started walking” 
toward Dempsey.24  According to La Torre, “[a]s he started 
approaching the police officer, [Dempsey] tased him.”25  At 
the time Dempsey tased him, Newsuan was not running at 
Dempsey, but rather “walking in response to the officer 
telling him to come here.”26 
 
Upon being tased, Newsuan’s “body started 
convulging [sic], like shaking.”27  Newsuan reached up and 
pulled the taser prongs from his body, at which point 
Dempsey drew his gun and began backing away from 
Newsuan.  Newsuan was “just staring” at Dempsey.28  La 
Torre ran back into the house, grabbed her phone, and began 
calling Newsuan’s mother and brother.  Through the window, 
she could see Dempsey with his gun still drawn, but could not 
see Newsuan.  La Torre became frightened and ran into her 
bedroom, meaning that she did not see the physical 
altercation between Dempsey and Newsuan.  While in the 
bedroom, she heard four gunshots in rapid succession.  She 
went back out to the street and saw Newsuan lying in the 
street.  Newsuan died shortly thereafter.  
                                              
24 Id. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. 205. 
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 B.  Procedural Background 
 
 Plaintiff Geraldine Johnson, as administratrix of 
Kenyado Newsuan’s estate, brought this action under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Officer Dempsey used excessive 
force against Newsuan in violation of the Fourth Amendment 
and that the City of Philadelphia was liable for Dempsey’s 
actions under Monell v. Department of Social Services,29  
Plaintiff also brought state-law claims for assault and battery 
and wrongful death.   After full discovery, the defendants 
moved for summary judgment.   
 
The District Court granted summary judgment to the 
defendants.  It held that there was no genuine material dispute 
that Officer Dempsey reasonably used deadly force to defend 
himself from Newsuan’s attack.  In response to Plaintiff’s 
argument that Dempsey should have retreated and awaited 
backup rather than confront Newsuan, the court held that 
Newsuan’s violent attack, and particularly his attempt to take 
Dempsey’s gun, severed any causal link between Dempsey’s 
initial actions at the scene and his subsequent use of lethal 
defensive force.  Because Plaintiff’s state-law claims were 
either contingent on or required a higher showing than the 
excessive force claim, the District Court dismissed them as 
well.  This appeal followed. 
                                              
29 436 U.S. 658 (1978). 
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II. DISCUSSION30 
 
A claim that a police officer used excessive force 
during a seizure is “properly analyzed under the Fourth 
Amendment’s ‘objective reasonableness’ standard.”31  There 
is no dispute that Officer Dempsey “seized” Newsuan for 
Fourth Amendment purposes when he shot and killed him.32  
The only question is whether Officer Dempsey’s use of force 
was objectively reasonable under the circumstances.33  At the 
summary judgment stage, once we identify the relevant facts 
and draw all inferences in the non-movant’s favor, the 
reasonableness of an officer’s actions “is a pure question of 
law.”34   
                                              
30 The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1291.  “[O]ur review of a grant of summary 
judgment is plenary, and in making that review we use the 
same standard as a district court: whether there are genuine 
issues of material fact precluding entry of summary 
judgment.”  Acumed LLC v. Advanced Surgical Servs., Inc., 
561 F.3d 199, 211 (3d Cir. 2009).  A fact is “material” if it 
could affect the outcome, and an issue of material fact is 
“genuine” if the evidence is sufficient to permit a reasonable 
jury to return a verdict for the non-moving party.  Anderson v. 
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Celotex Corp. 
v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). 
31 Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388 (1989).   
32 Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7 (1985). 
33 See Abraham v. Raso, 183 F.3d 279, 290 (3d Cir. 1999) 
(quoting Scott v. Henrich, 39 F.3d 912, 915 (9th Cir. 1994)).   
34 Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 381 n.8 (2007). 
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Before proceeding, it is necessary to clarify our Fourth 
Amendment standard in deadly-force cases.  Following the 
Supreme Court’s lead in Tennessee v. Garner,35 we have 
previously suggested that an officer’s use of deadly force is 
justified under the Fourth Amendment only when (1) the 
officer has reason to believe that the suspect poses a 
“significant threat of death or serious physical injury to the 
officer or others,” and (2) deadly force is necessary to prevent 
the suspect’s escape or serious injury to others.36  In Scott v. 
Harris, however, the Supreme Court clarified that “Garner 
did not establish a magical on/off switch that triggers rigid 
preconditions whenever an officer’s actions constitute ‘deadly 
force.’”37  Rather, Garner was “simply an application of the 
Fourth Amendment’s ‘reasonableness’ test to the use of a 
particular type of force in a particular situation.”38  Scott 
abrogates our use of special standards in deadly-force cases 
and reinstates “reasonableness” as the ultimate—and only—
inquiry.  “Whether or not [an officer’s] actions constituted 
application of ‘deadly force,’ all that matters is whether [the 
officer’s] actions were reasonable.”39  This is not to say that 
the considerations enumerated in Garner are irrelevant to the 
reasonableness analysis; to the contrary, in many cases, 
including this one, a proper assessment of the threat of injury 
                                              
35 471 U.S. at 3. 
36 See Abraham, 183 F.3d at 289. 
37 550 U.S. 372, 382 (2007). 
38 Id. (internal citations omitted). 
39 Id. at 383; see also Acosta v. Hill, 504 F.3d 1323, 1324 (9th 
Cir. 2007) (under Scott, “there is no special Fourth 
Amendment standard for unconstitutional deadly force”). 
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or the risk of flight is crucial to identifying the magnitude of 
the governmental interests at stake.  But such considerations 
are simply the means by which we approach the ultimate 
inquiry, not constitutional requirements in their own right. 
 
The reasonableness of a seizure is assessed in light of 
the totality of the circumstances.40  We analyze this question 
“from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, 
rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight,” making 
“allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to 
make split-second judgments—in circumstances that are 
tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the amount of 
force that is necessary in a particular situation.”41 
 
We begin with a proposition that can scarcely be 
disputed: once Newsuan began reaching for Dempsey’s gun, 
Dempsey was justified in using deadly force to defend 
himself.  Each of the three witnesses to the fight (Cruz, 
Rivera, and Dempsey) testified that Newsuan rushed at 
Dempsey, began violently grappling with him, and slammed 
Dempsey into multiple cars.42  Dempsey and Rivera testified 
that Newsuan struck Dempsey in the head multiple times.  All 
three witnesses agree that Newsuan then attempted to grab 
Dempsey’s gun out of its holster.  At that point there was a 
serious risk that Newsuan would kill Dempsey, and no 
                                              
40 Abraham, 183 F.3d at 289. 
41 Graham, 490 U.S. at 396-97.   
42 The fourth witness, La Torre, had retreated to her bedroom 
and did not see the altercation. 
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reasonable juror could conclude that it was unreasonable for 
Dempsey to deploy lethal force in response.43 
 
This conclusion, however, does not end the inquiry.  A 
proper Fourth Amendment analysis requires us to assess not 
only the reasonableness of Dempsey’s actions at the precise 
moment of the shooting, but the “totality of circumstances” 
leading up to the shooting.44  Building out from this principle, 
Plaintiff argues that even if Dempsey was justified in using 
                                              
43 Plaintiff claims that Dempsey was carrying his handgun in 
a department-issued holster that makes it difficult for 
someone who is not the officer to remove the gun.  Whatever 
the precise likelihood that Newsuan would have been able to 
remove the gun, the unrebutted testimony is that Newsuan 
was violently assaulting Dempsey and striking him repeatedly 
in the head, despite having been shot point-blank with a taser.  
Given that the two men were already engaged in a life-
threatening physical struggle, Newsuan’s attempt to wrest 
away Dempsey’s weapon was ample justification for the use 
of defensive deadly force in that instant. 
44 See Abraham, 183 F.3d at 292 (recognizing that “events 
prior to a seizure” should “be considered in analyzing the 
reasonableness of the seizure”); see also id. at 291-92 (“[W]e 
want to express our disagreement with those courts which 
have held that analysis of ‘reasonableness’ under the Fourth 
Amendment requires excluding any evidence of events 
preceding the actual seizure. . . .  [W]e do not see how these 
cases can reconcile the Supreme Court’s rule requiring 
examination of the ‘totality of the circumstances’ with a rigid 
rule that excludes all context and causes prior to the moment 
the seizure is finally accomplished.”). 
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deadly force after he was attacked, the seizure as a whole was 
unreasonable because Dempsey should never have confronted 
Newsuan in the first place.  In support of this argument, 
Plaintiff cites a Philadelphia Police Department directive that 
instructs officers who encounter severely mentally disabled 
persons (including persons experiencing drug-induced 
psychosis) to wait for back-up, to attempt to de-escalate the 
situation through conversation, and to retreat rather than 
resort to force.45  Plaintiff points out that Dempsey knew or 
should have known that Newsuan was obviously disturbed;46 
                                              
45 Philadelphia Police Directive 136 instructs patrol officers 
who encounter a severely mentally disabled person to, among 
other things, “[a]ssess the situation, attempt to de-escalate the 
situation through communication, take defensive measures, 
and attempt to maintain a zone of safety”; “[r]equest adequate 
back up”; “[r]equest a supervisor”; “avoid any immediate 
aggressive action unless there is an imminent threat to life or 
physical danger to the [subject], the police, or other civilians 
present”; and “[a]ttempt to place themselves in a position that 
does not require taking unnecessary or overly aggressive 
actions.”  J.A. 24-25. 
46 Officer Dempsey testified that on each of the five previous 
occasions he had encountered a naked person in the street, the 
person had been high on PCP.  He could tell these persons 
were under the influence of PCP because he knew that, 
“[w]hen someone does PCP they get hot inside. . . .  So they 
take off their clothing and they go outside, and then the 
appearance of being high.  That’s what leads me to believe 
they’re on PCP.”  J.A. 94.  Dempsey could not recall whether 
he suspected that Newsuan was under the influence of PCP, 
but acknowledged that the radio description of Newsuan’s 
behavior “fits with the symptoms of PCP.”  Id. 101. 
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that Dempsey knew Newsuan was naked and unarmed; and 
that Dempsey also knew that he had responded to two prior 
calls to the same area without receiving any indication that 
the subject was endangering or threatening people.  Plaintiff 
asserts that, under these circumstances, it was unreasonable 
for Dempsey to flout departmental policy by initiating a one-
on-one encounter with Newsuan. 
 
We do not automatically discount Plaintiff’s Fourth 
Amendment argument or the two presumptions on which it 
rests: that official police department policies may be 
considered among other things in the reasonableness inquiry47 
and that a “totality of the circumstances” analysis should 
account for whether the officer’s own reckless or deliberate 
                                              
47 Our sister circuits have split on the question of whether 
police department policies may be used to assess whether a 
seizure is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.  Compare 
Stamps v. Town of Framingham, 813 F.3d 27, 32 n.4 (1st Cir. 
2016) (police training and procedures “do not, of course, 
establish the constitutional standard but may be relevant to 
the Fourth Amendment analysis”), and Drummond ex rel. 
Drummond v. City of Anaheim, 343 F.3d 1052, 1059 (9th Cir. 
2003) (“Although . . . training materials are not dispositive, 
we may certainly consider a police department’s own 
guidelines when evaluating whether a particular use of force 
is constitutionally unreasonable.”), with Tanberg v. Sholtis, 
401 F.3d 1151, 1163-64 (10th Cir. 2005) (“That an arrest 
violated police department procedures does not make it more 
or less likely that the arrest implicates the Fourth 
Amendment, and evidence of the violation is therefore 
irrelevant.”). 
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conduct unreasonably created the need to use deadly force.48  
But there is no need for us to take up such constitutional 
considerations here, because Plaintiff’s claim founders on a 
more fundamental tort requirement: proximate causation.   
 
Whether or not Dempsey acted unreasonably at the 
outset of his encounter with Newsuan, Plaintiff must still 
prove that Dempsey’s allegedly unconstitutional actions 
proximately caused Newsuan’s death.49  Under ordinary tort 
principles, a superseding cause breaks the chain of proximate 
causation.50  In Bodine v. Warwick, we recognized that this 
principle limits Section 1983 liability for an officer’s use of 
force even where the officer’s initial actions violate the 
Fourth Amendment: 
 
Suppose that three police officers go to a 
suspect’s house to execute an arrest warrant and 
that they [enter illegally] . . . . Once inside, they 
                                              
48 See Abraham, 183 F.3d at 292 (“[W]e think all of the 
events transpiring during the officers’ pursuit of [the suspect] 
can be considered in evaluating the reasonableness of [the 
officer’s] shooting.”); Jiron v. City of Lakewood, 392 F.3d 
410, 415 (10th Cir. 2004) (“The reasonableness of the use of 
force depends not only on whether the officers were in danger 
at the precise moment that they used force, but also on 
whether the officers’ own reckless or deliberate conduct 
during the seizure unreasonably created the need to use such 
force.” (internal quotation omitted)). 
49 See Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 285 (1980).   
50 Lamont v. New Jersey, 637 F.3d 177, 185-86 (3d Cir. 
2011); Bodine v. Warwick, 72 F.3d 393, 400 (3d Cir. 1993). 
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encounter the suspect, identify themselves, 
show him the warrant, and tell him that they are 
placing him under arrest. The suspect, however, 
breaks away, shoots and kills two of the 
officers, and is preparing to shoot the third 
officer when that officer disarms the suspect 
and in the process injures him. Is the third 
officer necessarily liable for the harm caused to 
the suspect on the theory that the illegal entry . . 
. rendered any subsequent use of force 
unlawful? The obvious answer is “no.” The 
suspect’s conduct would constitute a 
“superseding” cause that would limit the 
officer’s liability.51 
While there is no precise test for determining when a 
civilian’s intervening acts will constitute a superseding cause 
of his own injury, relevant considerations include whether the 
harm actually suffered differs in kind from the harm that 
would ordinarily have resulted from the officer’s initial 
actions; whether the civilian’s intervening acts are a 
reasonably foreseeable response to the officer’s initial 
actions; whether the civilian’s intervening acts are themselves 
inherently wrongful or illegal; and the culpability of the 
civilian’s intervening acts.52   
 
Although proximate causation is generally a question 
of fact,53 it “becomes an issue of law when there is no 
                                              
51 Id (citations omitted). 
52 See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 442 (1965). 
53 Rivas v. City of Passaic, 365 F.3d 181, 193 (3d Cir. 2004). 
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evidence from which a jury could reasonably find the 
required proximate, causal nexus between the careless act and 
the resulting injuries.”54   Here, we conclude as a matter of 
law that Newsuan’s violent, precipitate, and illegal attack on 
Officer Dempsey severed any causal connection between 
Dempsey’s initial actions and his subsequent use of deadly 
force during the struggle in the street.  Whatever harms we 
may expect to ordinarily flow from an officer’s failure to 
await backup when confronted with a mentally disturbed 
individual, they do not include the inevitability that the 
officer will be rushed, choked, slammed into vehicles, and 
forcibly dispossessed of his service weapon.  We therefore 
have little trouble concluding that Newsuan’s life-threatening 
assault, coupled with his attempt to gain control of 
Dempsey’s gun, was the direct cause of his death.  
 
Before continuing on, however, we sound a note of 
caution.  The question of proximate causation in this case is 
made straightforward by the exceptional circumstances 
presented—namely, a sudden, unexpected attack that 
instantly forced the officer into a defensive fight for his life.  
As discussed above, that rupture in the chain of events, 
coupled with the extraordinary violence of Newsuan’s 
assault, makes the Fourth Amendment reasonableness 
analysis similarly straightforward.  Given the extreme facts of 
this case, our opinion should not be misread to broadly 
immunize police officers from Fourth Amendment liability 
whenever a mentally disturbed person threatens an officer’s 
physical safety.  Depending on the severity and immediacy of 
                                              
54 Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J. v. Arcadian Corp., 189 F.3d 305, 
318 (3d Cir. 1999) (quoting Gaines-Tabb v. ICI Explosives, 
USA, Inc., 160 F.3d 613, 620 (10th Cir. 1998)). 
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the threat and any potential risk to public safety posed by an 
officer’s delayed action, it may be appropriate for an officer 
to retreat or await backup when encountering a mentally 
disturbed individual.  It may also be appropriate for the 
officer to attempt to de-escalate an encounter to eliminate the 
need for force or to reduce the amount of force necessary to 
control an individual.55  Nor should it be assumed that 
mentally disturbed persons are so inherently unpredictable 
that their reactions will always sever the chain of causation 
between an officer’s initial actions and a subsequent use of 
force.  If a plaintiff produces competent evidence that persons 
who have certain illnesses or who are under the influence of 
certain substances are likely to respond to particular police 
actions in a particular way, that may be sufficient to create a 
jury issue on causation.   And of course, nothing we say today 
should discourage police departments and municipalities from 
devising and rigorously enforcing policies to make tragic 
events like this one less likely.56  The facts of this case, 
                                              
55 See Martin v. City of Broadview Heights, 712 F.3d 951, 
958 (6th Cir. 2013) (reasonable jury could conclude that 
officers should have de-escalated encounter with distraught 
individual through verbal intervention rather than physical 
force); Deorle v. Rutherford, 272 F.3d 1272, 1282-83 (9th 
Cir. 2001) (holding that a civilian’s mental status must be 
considered in determining the reasonableness of a use of 
force, and observing that, with respect to emotionally 
disturbed persons, “a heightened use of less-than-lethal force 
will usually be helpful in bringing a dangerous situation to a 
swift end”).   
56 See Megan Pauly, How Police Officers Are (or Aren’t) 
Trained in Mental Health, The Atlantic, (Oct. 11, 2013) 
http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2013/10/how-
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however, are extraordinary.  Whatever the Fourth 
Amendment requires of officers encountering emotionally or 
mentally disturbed individuals, it does not oblige an officer to 
passively endure a life-threatening physical assault, regardless 
of the assailant’s mental state. 
 
Finally, Plaintiff offers an alternative basis for Fourth 
Amendment liability.  In addition to faulting Dempsey for the 
manner in which he initiated the encounter, Plaintiff suggests 
that it was also unreasonable for Officer Dempsey to shoot 
Newsuan with his taser during the lead-up to the fight.  This 
contention is buttressed by La Torre’s testimony that 
Newsuan was simply walking toward Dempsey in compliance 
with Dempsey’s orders when Dempsey tased him, as well as 
by Rivera’s testimony that he never heard Dempsey issue any 
commands before tasing Newsuan.  But even if we were to 
deem this particular use of force unreasonable, the requisite 
causal connection between the taser strike and Dempsey’s 
later use of deadly force would still be lacking.  
  
According to La Torre, after Dempsey shot Newsuan 
with the taser, Newsuan reached up and pulled the taser 
prongs from his body.   Dempsey then drew his gun and 
began backing away from Newsuan, while Newsuan “just 
star[ed]” at him.57   La Torre ran back inside and called 
Newsuan’s mother and brother on the phone.  The last thing 
                                                                                                     
police-officers-are-or-aren-t-trained-in-mental-health/280485/ 
(last visited August 16, 2016) (discussing prevalence, 
success, and challenges of so-called Crisis Intervention 
Training for police officers). 
57 J.A. 205. 
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she saw from the window was Dempsey standing with his 
gun drawn.  This testimony establishes that Newsuan was 
essentially unfazed by the taser strike.  According to 
La Torre, Newsuan simply removed the taser prongs and 
stared at Dempsey in a continued standoff that lasted long 
enough for La Torre to place two phone calls from inside the 
house.  Therefore, even after drawing all inferences in 
Plaintiff’s favor, no reasonable juror could conclude that 
Newsuan’s subsequent physical attack was an involuntary or 
foreseeable defensive response to the taser strike described by 
La Torre.   
 
More importantly, La Torre did not see any part of the 
physical fight, including who initiated it or how Dempsey and 
Newsuan went from a gun-drawn standoff, as recounted by 
La Torre, to a close-quarters fight.  What this means is that 
the only evidence concerning how Newsuan and Dempsey 
came into physical contact is the unrebutted testimony of 
Dempsey, Cruz, and Rivera.  Each of them testified that 
Newsuan rushed at Dempsey unprovoked and that the taser 
barely slowed Newsuan in his attempt to grab Dempsey.  
Each of them also testified that Newsuan slammed Dempsey 
into parked cars and reached for Dempsey’s gun.  In the 
absence of a competing account, those undisputed actions are 
superseding causes that absolve Dempsey of any liability for 
his initial conduct. 
 
III. CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that Office 
Dempsey’s use of deadly force was reasonable under the 
circumstances, and that any allegedly unreasonable decisions 
he made during his initial encounter with Newsuan did not 
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proximately cause Newsuan’s death.  Our dismissal of 
Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claim requires the dismissal of 
her remaining Monell and state-law claims as well.58   
 
We will therefore affirm the judgment of the District 
Court. 
                                              
58 See Pl. Br. 33-34 (“Plaintiff agrees that if there is no claim 
against Officer Dempsey under the Fourth Amendment then 
Plaintiff has no right to assert its state claims against 
Dempsey and its Monell claim against the City.”); Grazier ex 
rel. White v. City of Phila., 328 F.3d 120, 124 (3d Cir. 2003) 
(municipality cannot be held liable on a Monell claim absent 
an underlying constitutional violation); Renk v. City of 
Pittsburgh, 641 A.2d 289, 293 (Pa. 1994) (under 
Pennsylvania law, the “reasonableness of the force used in 
making the arrest determines whether the police officer’s 
conduct constitutes an assault and battery”); Sunderland v. 
R.A. Barlow Homebuilders, 791 A.2d 384, 390-91 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 2002) (“A wrongful death action is derivative of the injury 
which would have supported the decedent’s own cause of 
action and is dependent upon the decedent’s cause of action 
being viable at the time of death.”). 
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Johnson v. City of Philadelphia 
 
No. 15-2346 
 
_________________________________________________ 
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge, dissenting: 
 
 While the members of the majority may be satisfied 
that Newsuan’s attack on Officer Dempsey was sufficient to 
sever any causal chain, I believe that Newsuan’s reaction was, 
unfortunately, all too foreseeable.  Directive 136—the police 
regulation that Officer Dempsey supposedly violated—states 
that its main objective “is to aid and protect the interests of 
the [mentally disturbed person], innocent bystanders, and 
family members in the immediate area, without 
compromising the safety of all parties concerned, including 
the police officers.  This is best accomplished by DE-
ESCALATING THE INCIDENT” (emphasis in original).1  
The purpose of regulations like Directive 136 is clear—to 
reduce the risk of a deadly confrontation with an extremely 
vulnerable population.  That such a regulation is necessary to 
reduce the risk of a deadly confrontation demonstrates that 
                                                          
1 While this directive is cited as “Directive 136” by both 
parties, as of January 9, 2015, the directive appears under the 
number 10.9.  J.A. 21–29 (being cited as Directive 136); 
Severely Mentally Disabled Persons, Philadelphia Police 
Department (Jan. 9, 2015), available at 
https://www.phillypolice.com/assets/directives/D10.9-
SeverelyMentallyDisabledPersons.pdf (being cited as 
Directive 10.9). 
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deadly confrontations are a foreseeable result of ignoring the 
regulation. 
 
 Viewing the facts before us in a light most favorable to 
the non-movant, Officer Dempsey, ignoring the Philadelphia 
Police Department’s calculated use of caps lock, escalated the 
incident.  Facing a naked, unarmed man who by all accounts 
had not been reported to the police as an “immediate threat to 
life or physical danger” to anyone, Officer Dempsey 
approached Newsuan and beckoned him to “come here,” 
without backup, in violation of police regulation.  By 
Dempsey’s own account, his approach was not made to 
apprehend and secure Newsuan, but was made because 
Dempsey “wanted to see if [Newsuan] was in some type of 
distress.  He obviously needed some type of care.”2  By 
knowingly violating a police department regulation designed 
to keep mentally disturbed individuals safe, Dempsey set into 
motion the confrontation that ultimately led to Newsuan’s 
death – a confrontation whose foreseeability was the impetus 
for the establishment of Directive 136. 
 
 Our limited precedent on the issue of superseding 
causes in excessive force cases is instructive.  In Lamont v. 
New Jersey, we held that an individual’s quick hand 
movement—perceived by officers as drawing a weapon—
occurring after officers had violated police procedures to 
pursue the individual, constituted a superseding cause.3  In so 
holding, we noted that a contrary holding would “tend to 
deter police officers ‘from approaching and detaining 
                                                          
2 J.A. at 102-03. 
3 637 F.3d 177, 186 (2011). 
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potentially violent suspects.’”4  But the officers in Lamont 
were pursuing an individual who, they expected, was armed 
and potentially dangerous.  The officers were so informed 
when they chose to violate police procedures in pursuing him.  
Such cannot be said of Officer Dempsey here, as Newsuan 
was clearly unarmed and had not been exhibiting violent 
conduct prior to their interaction.  There is an important 
distinction between these two types of cases—one in which 
an officer, through his conduct, creates the situation that calls 
for the use of force, and one in which the officer’s 
misconduct, while perhaps factually linked to the eventual use 
of force, does not contribute to the “dangerous situation.”5  
Additionally, holding that Newsuan’s behavior was not a 
superseding cause would not create the perverse deterrent 
effects we feared in Lamont:  to the contrary, deterring police 
officers from approaching mentally disturbed suspects in a 
way that may compromise the safety of either the officer or 
the individual is an end we should seek to achieve, rather than 
avoid. 
 
 I am also not persuaded that Newsuan’s attack was an 
unforeseeable result of his being tased by Officer Dempsey.  
Taking the facts in the light most favorable to the non-
movant, Dempsey was aware that Newsuan was on PCP at 
the time of their encounter.  The Philadelphia Police 
Department teaches its officers that a taser strike may fail to 
                                                          
4 Id. (quoting Hundley v. District of Columbia, 494 F.3d 
1097, 1105 (D.C. Cir. 2007)). 
5 See Estate of Starks v. Enyart, 5 F.3d 230 (7th Cir. 1993) 
(officer who jumped in front of a speeding car, then used 
deadly force to stop driver, would not be entitled to qualified 
immunity). 
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subdue a suspect on PCP due to the drug’s effects on pain 
tolerance.6  It was therefore foreseeable to Officer Dempsey 
that his taser would be ineffective against Newsuan.  The 
most favorable account of the facts prior to Newsuan’s being 
tased is that Newsuan was “approaching” Officer Dempsey—
presumably in response to Dempsey’s request that Newsuan 
“come here.”  A jury could reasonably conclude that Officer 
Dempsey, by firing his taser, took an “immediate aggressive 
action” in violation of police department regulations and in 
doing so escalated the situation and created a risk of harm to 
both himself and to Newsuan. 
 
 The death of individuals with mental health problems 
at the hands of the police continues to occur across the 
country.7  The first line of defense against these incidents is 
the establishment of police regulations designed to prevent 
interactions between police officers and mentally disabled 
people from escalating into deadly confrontations.  Declaring 
that an officer who disregards such a regulation has not 
proximately caused a violent confrontation that the regulation 
is in place to prevent renders the regulation toothless.  Given 
the available factual accounts of the events leading up to 
Newsuan’s eventual death, including the possible disregard of 
a regulation that was designed to guard against violent 
confrontations, I cannot say that “there is no evidence from 
which a jury could reasonably find the required proximate, 
                                                          
6 J.A. 244. 
7 E.g., Kate Mather and James Queally, More Than a Third of 
People Shot by L.A. Police Last Year Were Mentally Ill, 
LAPD Report Finds, L.A. Times (Mar. 1, 2016), 
http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-lapd-use-of-
force-report-20160301-story.html. 
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causal nexus between the careless act and the resulting 
injuries.”8 
 
 For the above reasons, I respectfully dissent.  I would 
reverse the judgment of the District Court and remand this 
case for further proceedings.     
                                                          
8 Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J. v. Arcadian Corp., 189 F.3d 305, 
318 (3d Cir. 1999) (quoting Gaines-Tabb v. ICI Explosives, 
USA, Inc., 160 F.3d 613, 620 (10th Cir. 1998)). 
